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In this paper we consider the impact of migrant workers on the Israeli wage structure,
on the chances of being unemployed or out of the labor force and on inequality in
gross earnings from work.
One of the manifestations of globalization is the movement of migrant workers from
low-income to richer countries. The recent increase in living standards in Israel has
created significant wage differentials for workers from low-income countries.
Paradoxically, an important trigger for this process was also the worsening of Israel’s
security situation in 1993, following the Oslo accord between Israel and the
Palestinians. Israel responded to the deterioration by closures, which sharply reduced
the number of Palestinian workers in Israel, substituting them with migrant workers,
mainly from Eastern Europe, South and Central America and the Far East.
The rapid inflow of migrant workers, especially since 1995, makes Israel an
interesting case study for studying its effects on labor force participation,
unemployment, the wage structure and gross earnings inequality. Given the bias in the
government’s permit policy in favor of unskilled workers, the paper emphasizes the
effects on Israelis with weak economic endowments.
The research is based on a pooled micro data set, combined with data on the number
of non-Israeli workers by economic branch. The micro-data is based on the Israeli
income survey, including a host of personal characteristics, such as the individual’s
education level, labor market status and a model-based calculation of welfare benefits.
The research also focuses on government policy issues, such as the effect of the
replacement ratio on the rate of labor force participation. For individuals not in the
labor force the replacement ratio is defined as the income support payment divided by
the potential wage. The inflow of migrant workers affects the potential wage
negatively and together with a relatively easy access to income support payments, this
policy variable is found to contribute significantly to the explanation of the exclusion
from the labor force and the worsening of gross earnings distribution in a statistically
significant way. The effect of these variables on unemployment is less clear and the
effects on the wage structure are varied, distinguishing between substitutive and
complementary effects, depending on the individual’s occupational and educational
characteristics as well as on the time perspective.
The study also shows that the highly branch-specific migrant permit policy did not
prevent the effects on wages from spreading throughout the economy, thus
emphasizing the general-equilibrium nature of these effects.
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21. Introduction
This study analyses the effect of the massive inflow of low skilled migrant workers1
into the Israeli labor market in the second half of the 1990s on the Israeli labor
market. The migrant workers’ presence in the labor market grew rapidly since 1993
and by 2001, non-Israeli workers2 reached about 12 percent of the Israeli labor force –
a proportion more than twice as high as the OECD average.3
This research studies the effect of the supply of non-Israeli workers on the Israeli
labor market, emphasizing the effect on the low skilled and poorly educated among
the working age population. We also study the relationship between the government’s
policy on migrant workers and on income support for people in the working age. The
former affects the alternative wage of domestic low skilled workers and the latter
affects their reservation wage. Therefore the combined effect is expected to have an
important effect on the replacement ratio (reservation wage/alternative wage). The
present study aims at understanding the influence of migration both on the
participation rate and the rate of unemployment.
There is a vast literature on economic effects of migrant workers on the labor markets
in the host countries and in the countries of emigration. One of the basic questions in
many such studies is to what extent the migrant labor constitutes a substitute or a
complement to domestic labor. A substitutive relationship is present when the
increase in the supply of migrant workers reduces the price of the domestic production
factor (ceteris paribus); a complementary relationship implies a rise in the price of
domestic production factor. De New and Zimmermann (1994) have found a general
and predominant drop in domestic wages, particularly for blue collar workers, and a
slight increase in the salary of white collar employees. The empirical literature on the
American economy is less clear. For domestic workers the relationship was mainly
complementary (data for the 1970s).4 The effect on working women has been
                                                  
1 These are not to be confounded with the large wave of Jewish immigration mainly from the former
Soviet Union and Ethiopia in the early 1990s, who are entitled to citizenship. However these “new
immigrants” have strongly affected the Israeli labor market. Therefore they are included here as
explanatory variables.
2 Non-Israeli workers include migrant (i.e. foreign) workers and Palestinian workers, who reside in the
territories occupied by Israel.
3 The Annual Report, 2001, on “Trends in International Migration: Continuous reporting system on
migration” reports on an average ratio of migrant workers of 5.3% for the OECD.
4 See Borjas (1983), Baldwin and Grossman (1982), Gang and Rivera-Batiz (1994)
3observed to be mainly substitutive.5 Borjas emphasizes the effect of migration on the
second and third generation.
The intensity of the relationship between the foreign and domestic production factors
depends crucially on government policy. The US government for example,
encourages, at least formally, highly skilled immigrants6, whereas the Israeli
government accepts only low skilled migrant workers.7
In this paper we study the effects of the inflow of migrant workers on four issues:
1) the wage structure of Israeli workers (direct and indirect effects),
2) the probability of Israeli workers to be out of the labor force,
3) the probability to be employed (versus unemployed),
4) the effect on the distribution of gross earnings from work.
These effects are shown to depend (among other things) on the extent of the migration
relatively to the working age population in the host economy, and - in the short run -
on the distribution of the permits among economic sectors. Effects on unemployment
and on the participation rate tend to be of permanent nature, particularly in the
presence of hysteresis in the rate of unemployment. An interesting question in this
respect is whether there exists a critical share of migrant workers that operates as a
threshold for domestic workers to abandon that sector.
The basic conjecture is that the presence of non-Israeli workers is concentrated mainly
in low wage industries, such as construction, agriculture or personal services.
Inadequate implementation of labor laws, especially the minimum wage law, with
respect to migrant workers, puts pressure on the wage rate in the sectors with a high
ratio of migrant workers. Israelis with similar skills, who have to compete for
workplaces in the low skill range, face low wages, whereas those, for whom migrant
workers constitute a complementary production factor, experience an improvement in
labor market outcomes. The relevant reservation wage in the short run is given by the
level of unemployment benefits or income support payments.
                                                  
5 See Bean et al. (1988) or Taylor et al. (1988).
6 See Borjas (1992, p. 21).
7 This was the case when, during the Hi tech boom of 1999/2000, Israeli Hi tech firms tried to convince
the government without success to open the Israeli labor market to Indian computer specialists, who
were ready to work at significantly lower wages than their Israeli counterparts. Of course, this does not
4In general, the government’s control over illegal immigration will be more difficult to
achieve, the higher the wage differential between the source economies of migrant
workers and the host economy, and the more open the host economy is toward the
global economy and the weaker the enforcement efforts of labor laws, particularly
concerning minimum wage and social benefits. A large proportion of illegal
immigration tends to be accompanied by negative externalities, such as xenophobia8.
Israel’s economy has been part of the general process of globalization, which gained
impetus in the second half of the 1990s. The rapid convergence of the Israeli standard
of living with that in Western countries has provided an important “pull factor”,
attracting migrant workers, similarly to the situation in the labor markets of Western
economies. Poverty stricken countries all over the world have for long been a major
source of migration. Furthermore, the collapse of labor markets in the Soviet bloc,
reflected by high unemployment and insufficient social protection, has since 1989
created a powerful “push factor” for worker migration from Eastern Europe and
Russia, mainly to Western Europe. Some of these population movements have also
reached the Israeli labor market.
In the next section the relatively scarce data on non-Israeli workers is presented.9 The
methodology used is discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the database. The
results are reported in section 5. Conclusions are drawn at the end.
2. The Non-Israeli Workers
The trigger for the immigration of foreign workers into the Israeli labor market was
supplied by the worsening of Israel’s security situation in 1993 after a wave of
stabbing attacks by Palestinians, who opposed the Oslo peace efforts, that had just
begun. Israel responded to this deterioration by closures, which eventually reduced the
number of Palestinian workers in Israel after about 25 years of high and growing
employment. Shortly thereafter the Israeli government yielded to heavy pressure by
                                                                                                                                                 
apply to the “new immigrants”, many of whom are highly qualified. However, as mentioned above,
they are not considered migrant workers, since they have an automatic right to Israeli citizenship.
8 See for example Castles and Miller (1993) and Layton-Henry (1992). An illuminating counter-
example of potential cultural benefits is provided in a lecture given by the Swiss author Max Frisch in
his article “Ueberfremdung 1, Ueberfremdung 2” (1966), in which this emblem of Swiss culture reveals
himself as a distant offspring of a foreign worker.
9 See also Bar-Tsuri (1999).
5lobbyists in the agricultural and construction sectors and allowed for the substitution
of the locked out Palestinian workers by migrant workers, mainly from Eastern
Europe, South America and the Far East. At first the permits were allocated to
entrepreneurs in construction and farming by the official labor exchange. Later on, the
labor exchange allowed the contractors’ association and the farmers’ association
(“Tnu’at Hamoshavim”) to intervene in the allocation process. This eventually
increased the lobbying groups’ influence on the decision about the number of
permits.10 In the last 4 years the government has also opened to migrant workers the
occupation of personal care for the aged and invalids. Workers in this occupation are
mainly recruited from the Philippines. These workers, while officially sanctioned, are
being limited only by demand criteria for those services, and not by any government
quota. Accordingly, this loophole constitutes an easy way to enter Israel with a work
permit, only to move on to other jobs. This, of course, jeopardizes the concept of
permit quotas. Unsurprisingly, in early 2002 this sector accounted for the highest
share of permits (46 percent, see chart 1). Furthermore, a rapidly increasing number of
illegal workers initially found their way into the labor market as tourists, becoming
illegal workers, once the tourist visa expired.
                                                  
10 See Bouhris commission (2001).
6The number of non-Israeli workers grew rapidly during the 1990s and peaked at more
than 300,000 in the year 2000. The fall in 2001 was due to the Intifada, which caused
a sharp drop in the number of Palestinians working in Israel. The share of foreigners
among non-Israeli workers grew from 26 percent in 1993 to 95 percent in 2001 (see
table 1).
Industry
4%
Personal services for 
aged and invalids
46%
Agriculture
29%
Construction
21%
Chart 1: Distribution of Permits
monthly average January to April 2002
total permits in April 2002: 78,819
Source: Official Labor exchange
Table 1: Basic data about Non-Israeli workers
Years
Work 
permits 
monthly 
averages
Employed 
Foreign 
workers
Foreign 
workers 
without 
permit
Foreign 
workers 
without 
permit /total 
workers
Employed 
Palestinians
Employed 
non-
Israelis
Foreign 
workers/non-
Israeli workers
Non-Israeli 
workers/Israelis 
in working age 
with 0-12 years 
of schooling
thousands thousands thousands percent thousands thousands percent percent
1990 n/a 3 n/a n/a 108 110 2 6
1991 n/a 9 n/a n/a 98 107 8 5
1992 n/a 17 n/a n/a 116 132 13 6
1993 n/a 30 2 7 84 114 26 5
1994 n/a 52 11 21 70 122 42 6
1995 70 92 22 24 60 152 61 7
1996 95 137 43 31 58 196 70 9
1997 92 159 67 42 75 234 68 11
1998 80 164 84 51 107 270 61 12
1999 73 184 110 60 116 299 61 13
2000 72 214 142 67 98 312 69 14
2001 97 246 149 61 12 258 95 n/a
1 Sources: Labor exchange and Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
2 The definition of unskilled workers has changed in 1995, thus rendering comparisons with earlier years difficult
7The largest share of non-Israeli workers (henceforth “migrant-ratio”) can be found in
construction (see chart 2). In the year 2000 their number slightly exceeded the
employment of Israelis. In agriculture the number of non-Israelis was more than 80
percent of Israeli workers. In food and tourism services as well as in community and
personal services (mainly in personal care for the aged and invalids) migrant-ratio
began to increase after 1997. In all other economic branches their share has been
negligible throughout the observation period.
The authorities lack a systematic knowledge on non-Israeli workers, such as personal
characteristics, wages, hours of work etc. Their number and distribution among
economic branches is estimated by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS).
In this study we combine data from the ICBS annual income survey on Israelis both
inside and outside the labor force with data on non-Israeli workers by economic
branches. The distribution by branches is based on information from employers’
insurance payments to the National Insurance Institute (NII). The ICBS then estimates
the likelihood of a foreign entrant to Israel being a migrant worker by use of a model
Chart 2: Share of Employed Non-Israelis to Israelis: 1995 to 2000
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8based on (1) the entry date of persons who have not exited the country after the visa
has expired and (2) their country of origin.11
An indirect and partial evidence on the extent of wage differentials between migrant
domestic workers can be derived from internal statistics of the enforcement unit in the
Ministry of Labor and Welfare.12
The enforcement unit audits a sample of varying size, reflecting about 0.2 to 2.4
percent of all non-Israeli workers.13 In the years 1996 to 2000 audited employers, who
were found to have paid wages below the minimum wage had to add about 7 percent
to their wage payments to migrant workers in order to fulfill the minimum wage
requirement. The shortfall was significantly higher than for all other population
groups. The fact that the probability of migrant workers being underpaid grew from
24 percent of audits in 1996 to 80 percent in 2000 reflects a low and deteriorating
compliance, mainly due to the neglect of penalties as a means of deterring employers.
The lack of enforcement lowers the employer’s wage cost of migrant workers and
thus affects the comparable Israeli worker’s competitiveness negatively.
                                                  
11 The information about the trends in the distribution of tourists by country of origin, is used to
calculate deviations from these trends. These deviations indicate an increase in migrant workers.
12 For a detailed analysis of these statistics see Gottlieb (2000).
13 The sampling procedure is based on investigation requests from the public and unsystematic
initiatives by the Ministry, thus causing samples not to be sufficiently representative. A major flaw in
the audit policy is that the enforcement unit does not report on any audited employers of Palestinian
workers, since they are supposed to be paid through the official labor exchange.
9The number of illegal foreign workers has been growing rapidly during the
observation period. In 1995 about 25 percent of foreigners were illegally employed;
by 1998 the number of legal and illegal workers was about equal and by the year 2000
illegal workers were twice as many as legal workers (see chart 3).
3. Methodology
(i) The effect of the inflow of migrant workers on the Israeli wage structure is
approached in two ways:
average
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1996-2000
Payments due to shortfall below the minimum wage
Migrants (men) 10.4% 9.6% 5.8% 8.8% 2.0% 7.3%
Israeli Arabs (men) 11.9% 1.0% 5.1% 1.6% 1.7% 4.3%
Jews (men) 1.0% 0.6% 10.8% 1.2% 1.8% 3.1%
Migrants (women) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.2% 3.6% 3.0%
Israeli Arabs (women) 0.7% 0.9% 5.7% 2.7% 5.2% 3.0%
Jews (women) 0.9% 0.8% 1.8% 1.7% 3.1% 1.6%
probability of getting less than minimum wage (assuming that the actual sample is representative)
Migrants (men) 24.2% 54.6% 63.5% 57.4% 80.2% 56.0%
Israeli Arabs (men) 20.9% 1.8% 20.2% 17.2% 11.8% 14.4%
Jews (men) 6.1% 3.1% 5.9% 2.9% 10.4% 5.7%
Migrants (women) 13.0% 45.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Israeli Arabs (women) 27.5% 12.8% 36.9% 37.2% 41.1% 31.1%
Jews (women) 8.9% 6.4% 3.9% 12.0% 43.4% 14.9%
Source: Enforcement reports for the years 1996 - 2000; The Unit for the enforcement of labor laws, Ministry of Labor and Welfare, Israel
Calculations: Daniel Gottlieb, Bank of Israel
Table 2: The Enforcement of the Minimum Wage
Chart 3: Legal and Illegal Migrant Workers
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One avenue is to examine what variables determine individual i's position (zi) on a
Lorenz curve of wage inequality, where
zi=S% of income (up to individual i) / S% of wage-earners (up to individual i) (1)
The position zi is unique for every individual i=1…n. It is given by the average slope
ai/bi and rises monotonically in a given year.14
Typically the individual’s position in the wage structure depends on personal
characteristics, such as gender, age, the amount and quality of schooling, work
experience; his or her occupation, the economic branch of employment, and so forth.
The question of interest here is to what extent the individual’s exposure to
competition from non-Israeli workers affects his relative position in the wage
structure:
                    (.)  (-) (-) (?)
zi,t,b,o,r = z (xi,t,b,o, ut, Dt, ft,b)  i=0...n, (2)
where i=1…n individuals, t is the time (year, quarter) of the survey response, b is the
economic branch in which the individual is occupied and o is the person’s occupation. x
                                                  
14 For this to be true for all observations in a given year, one needs to assume strict convexity of the
Lorenz curve. However, increasing inequality makes the distribution more convex.
Chart 4: The individual's relative position in the wage distribution
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
percent of population
Pe
rc
en
t o
f i
nc
om
e
equal distribution
actual distribution
a2
a1
b1
b2
zi=ai/bi, i=1,2
individual 1's position
individual 2's position
11
denotes a vector of individual characteristics, such as age, gender, religion, schooling,
marital status and work experience, ut is the unemployment rate at the time (quarter,
year), j denotes the lag in years (0,1) from the survey response, Dt is an aggregate
demand variable, ft,b is the ratio of non-Israeli workers to Israeli workers in the
economic branch (migrant ratio), in which the individual works, in the year of the
survey response. The sign in parentheses above the equation indicates the expected
direction of the effect. An increase in the migrant-ratio has a negative effect if the
individual’s position in the wage distribution deteriorates and a positive one otherwise.
Another avenue is to investigate the partial effect of the inflow of non-Israeli workers
on real wages. Here the log of the real wage is regressed on the whole sample and
various sub-samples, separately for the main industries and occupations:
                     (.)   (+)  (-)  (+) (?)(?)
log(wi,t,b,o) = w(xi,t,b,o, Dt, ut-j, wt, ft, ft,b),          (3)
where the suffix j denotes the lag in years (0,1) from the survey response, w is the
average wage rate, indicating a general productivity increase, and the other variables
and suffices are as indicated above. The effect of migrant workers’ ratio depends of
course on whether the migrants’ effect is of substitutive or complementary. This
question will be addressed empirically.15
(ii) The probability of Israeli workers to drop out of (or remain outside) the labor
force is tackled by a typical probability function of the type:
               (.)   (-) (+)(?)     (-)            (-)
p i,t,o,r = p (xi,t,o, ut, Dt, ft, isi,t/w*i,t,o, chi,t), i=0...n, (4)
where p is the probability to be outside the labor force, isi,t/w*i,t,o denotes the
replacement ratio with the income support (is) in the numerator and the alternative
wage rate (w*) in the denominator.
The income support variable is calculated by use of a statutory model, based on the
National Insurance law, combined with the relevant personal characteristics, of course
including the gross earnings from work, known from the income survey.16
                                                  
15 Furthermore there might be a case of simultaneity, since a high domestic wage rate tends to increase
the incentive for migration.
16 For example, the income support differs between married and unmarried, couples with or without
children, by age of the recipients etc.
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The alternative wage rate is calculated as the potential wage rate, an individual would
earn if he or she were employed, or the actual wage rate in case the person is working:
w*i,t,b,o = wi,t,b,o   - dH (5)
If the person is outside the labor force, w is a calculated forecast using those
parameters from the basic wage regression on wage earners, which correspond to the
individual’s characteristics. A certain discount (dH) is deducted in order to account
for the depreciation of this individual’s human capital due to absence from the labor
force or unemployment.17
chi,t indicates the number of children in the household and the signs in brackets are as
indicated above.
The direction of the effect, indicated in parentheses above each variable, corresponds
to the directions given in Bowen and Finegan (1969).18 Like in the previous equations,
the effect of migrant workers’ ratio depends of course on whether the migrants’ effect
is of substitutive (“losers”) or complementary (“winners”).
(iii) The probability to be employed (versus unemployed) is of similar nature as
equation (4), except that here the sample consists only of those in the labor force. This
data set includes also the economic branch (suffix b), in which the individual is
employed, or in which he or she was employed before becoming unemployed.
(iv) Migrant workers influence also inequality in market earnings from work. In this
section it is important to include also the unemployed and the people outside the labor
force, since, as discussed above, unemployment and the exit out of the labor force
may well be directly caused by migration. Accordingly, people, who are not working,
have an (imputed) labor income of zero. The market earnings of interest here are of
course only wages and earnings from self-employment. The earnings from capital and
other incomes are excluded, since they are unlikely to be influenced by migration.19
Migration has direct and indirect effects on the distribution of market incomes: The
direct effect works through the substitution or complementarity effect, as mentioned
                                                  
17 Given the ignorance concerning the duration of the individual’s absence from the labor force or
unemployment, an arbitrary rate d of 5 and 15 percent respectively is assumed here.
18 They divide the variables into the following groups: tastes, substitution effects of market earnings
and non-market earnings, the latter including mainly unemployment benefits and income support; see
op. cit. p. 20-21.
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above. The indirect effect works through the replacement ratio: If migration is
relatively homogenous with respect to the migrants’ skill level, this creates pressure
on the alternative wage of domestic workers with similar skill levels in the migration-
intensive economic branches. The statutory linkage of welfare benefits to average
wage increases but not decreases in Israel further raises the replacement ratio, thereby
lowering the incentive to remain in (or join) employment. However, there may also be
an employment-enhancing effect: Increased profits, due to low wage costs (and high
productivity) of migrant workers create investment opportunities and jobs,
particularly for those with complementary skills to those of the migrants.
Equations 2 and 3 are estimated by ordinary least squares and for equation 4 the
logistic regression model is used. In the regression on labor force participation, the
value for non-participation is 1 with probability p, and “0” otherwise.
P[y=1|x]= p(x) (6)
The Logit is given by equation
g(x)= ß0+ß1x1+ß2x2+…+ßnxn, (7)
Then the probability of event “1” can be written as
p(x)=exp[g(x)]/}1+exp]g(x){[ (8)
and the
odds ratio = }p(1) /[1- p(1)]{ /{ p(0)/[1- p(0)[ } (9)
In the regression on the employment-unemployment decision, “1” denotes the
employed and “0” the unemployed.
                                                                                                                                                 
19 Income from welfare and unemployment benefits are also excluded since we are interested in the
effect on market earnings.
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4. The Data
Detailed data on the migrant ratio exist only from 1995 onward. At the time of writing
the last available income survey was for the year 2000. Therefore, the observation
period was set at 1995 to 2000.20
The vector includes three types of variables for each individual:
(1) personal characteristics: household number, age, gender, number of children
(est.), labor market status, occupation, economic branch, wage, spouse’s wage,
etc.,
(2) macroeconomic variables: rate of unemployment, aggregate demand, the
average wage (all quarterly data);.
(3) economic policy variables, such as migrant ratio (annual data) and the
replacement ratio (on a quarterly basis).
The data on income support are calculated, based on the National insurance law, and
based on the individual’s and his or her household’s characteristics in the data set,
thus reflecting only an approximation to the actual level of income support.21
The income survey is carried out 4 times a year and published on an annual basis.
Since this allows for quarterly distinction of each observation within the year, the
attached macroeconomic variables are also on a quarterly basis, which conveniently
adds variability to the data. The size of the income survey has been growing over the
years. All in all, the pooled data set for the whole observation period includes about
125000 observations. The population analyzed includes men aged between 15 and 64
and women between 15 and 59 (in order to exclude retirement age).
                                                  
20 In order to assess the impact effect of government policy of migrant workers, it would have been
preferable to include also the years 1992 to 1994, during which the government’s policy concerning
foreign workers was radically changed, but due to the lack of data this was not possible.
21 Unfortunately, the actual income support cannot be drawn from actual data, since the income survey
reports only on the sum total of a host of transfer payments.
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5. Empirical Results
This section discusses the results from the regressions on the wage structure (tables 3
and 4), on real wages (tables 5, 6 and 7), on the probability to be out of the labor force
(tables 8 and 9) and on the probability to be employed versus unemployed. The results
on market-income (from labor) inequality (table 10) conclude this section.
5.1 The Effect of Migrant Workers on the Wage Structure
The presence of non-Israeli workers importantly affects the economy’s wage
structure. Their distribution is concentrated in specific branches, mostly in low skills.
In the short run we therefore expect a negative impact on the wages of Israeli low
skilled workers due to the substitutive relationship. We expect this impact effect to
grow with the intensity of the migrant ratio. We further expect to find a positive
impact effect in occupations, which are considered complementary to low skilled
work, e.g. managers at various levels.
Following are the main conclusions from tables 3 and 4:
As a by-product, this study confirms the result, known from other studies, that
education pays: it tends to improve the rank in the wage distribution.22 This is
indicated by the variable of the “last frequented school” and by the “number of
school-years”. In all regressions the number of school-years appears positively as
rank-increasing. Interestingly, the highest marginal reward is found in the regression
for Arab women. Studies in a Yeshiva23 worsen the wage position of Jewish men. The
same is true for Secondary school and for technically oriented High Schools. Similar
results hold for Jewish women. Studying at an academic institution raises the rank in
the general regression, for men, while for women (both Jewish and non-Jewish) and
for the Arab Israelis the coefficient is positive, though not significant. Some of the
educational institutions are significant at the general level (regressions 1 and 2 in table
3) but not so in most of the detailed regressions by nationality and gender. These
results are consistent with the commonly held belief that the high-tech sector is not
sufficiently open to the highly-educated Arab population. This result suggests that
                                                  
22 For a fuller treatment of this issue in Israel see for example Frisch and Mealem (1999).
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remuneration does not function sufficiently well as an incentive for human capital
formation in the Israeli Arab community.
Men tend to achieve a higher rank in the wage distribution than women. This result
confirms many labor market studies in Israel and abroad. The rank of Jewish men and
women tends to exceed that of non-Jews respectively and to a similar degree.24 For
women (both Arab and Jewish) the wage position shows a slight negative trend over
time. Non-Jewish wage-earners do not exhibit a statistically significant time trend.
The marital status: Marriage favors the rank in the Jewish population. Divorce and the
single status lower the rank of Arab women.
The type of occupation is an important determinant of the wage rank. Occupation in
academia or in the free professions is particularly rewarding for all population groups.
A possible policy implication is therefore that wage differentials for disadvantaged
Arab women could be effectively reduced in favor of that group by subsidizing
academic studies. Managerial activity raises the rank in all populations, except for
Arab women. All other occupations are either negative or inconclusive. Lack of skills
enters the various regressions significantly with substantially negative coefficients.
From casual observation we know that employers prefer to expose the higher skilled
to job training. In order to reduce wage differentials the government should therefore
probably aim at improving human capital among the unskilled.
Experience is found to improve the position on the Lorenz curve for wage earners.
Unemployment worsens the position. In other words, this means that unemployment
tends to shift the whole Lorenz curve away from equality. The regressions also
endorse the well-known result, that immigration25 is accompanied with an initial fall
in the immigrants’ relative wages.
The influence of non-Israeli workers on the wage distribution:
Let us first clarify the variables. The migrant intensity for each employed person
appears in his vector with the relevant year index. This number is then multiplied by a
                                                                                                                                                 
23 A school of Jewish studies beyond High School.
24 The income survey does not distinguish between Muslim, Christian Arabs, Druze and other (very
small) minorities, e.g. other Christians. When we use the term Arab, this includes all non-Jews in the
sample.
25 Here immigration stands for Jewish immigration, which is accompanied with full citizenship, as
distinct from the migration of foreign workers.
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dummy variable, defined as following: A value of 1 for individuals with less than 12
years of schooling or low skills, and a value of 0 otherwise. Those with a positive
value are called “weak workers”. Those, who are not considered weak, will have a
zero in their migrant intensity variable. Strong workers are defined as workers with
either more than 12 years of schooling or with an academic, managerial or
professional occupation. This variable thus combines the migrant intensity with a
variable that indicates the individual’s respective economic weakness or strength.
Since the migrant intensity is defined separately for the major economic branches, we
obtain separate variables for each economic branch. It was found that the migrant
intensity weakened the wage rank of the “weak” while strengthening the rank of the
“strong”. The directions of the effect were consistent in regressions 1 to 3 (mainly in
regression 1) except for construction and trade. In the various population groups the
results are statistically less significant. The signs of the coefficient are as expected,
except for Arab women. This insignificance may be due to the low number of
observations, which is probably due to the low participation rate of this population
group. This result implies that the entrance of non-Israeli workers into a limited
number of economic branches of the labor market caused a deterioration of the
earnings capacity of low skilled and poorly educated workers, not only in the
economic branches that were directly involved (such as agriculture), but also in
industry and business services. However, at the same time it improved the rank of
workers with strong economic attributes.
Two conclusions are worth noting:
(1) The results are significant also in branches with low migrant intensity,
suggesting the presence of a general equilibrium effect, which spreads beyond
the directly affected branches.
(2) The effect of non-Israeli workers on the wage structure was not uniform.
Economically weak workers suffered a wage loss, while the economically
stronger workers enjoyed a wage increase.
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Table 3: The Determinants of the the Individual's Rank in the wage structure
Dependent variable: The rank of the Israeli individual's gross wage
on the (yearly) Lorenz curve of wage earners - 1995 to 2000
OLS
Explanatory Variable
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Intercept 0.4489 0.0001  0.4867 0.0001  0.4642 0.0001  
Year -0.0001 0.0001  0.0000 0.0760 * -0.0001 0.0001  
Gender: m=1, f=0 0.0549 0.0001    
Jewish =1, Non-Jewish =0 0.0367 0.0001  0.0373 0.0001  0.0347 0.0001  
Year 1995 -0.0102 0.0027  -0.0103 0.0281  -0.0114 0.0213  
Year 1996 -0.0133 0.0001  -0.0109 0.0194  -0.0165 0.0008  
Electricity 0.1033 0.0001  0.1063 0.0001  0.0865 0.0001  
Public sector 0.0413 0.0001  0.0438 0.0001  0.0361 0.0001  
Education 0.0070 0.0137  0.0024 0.6013 * 0.0072 0.0746 *
Health 0.0005 0.8602 * 0.0004 0.9419 * 0.0020 0.6260 *
Community 0.0096 0.0052  0.0007 0.8854 * 0.0224 0.0001  
Households 0.0194 0.0001  0.0384 0.0001  0.0132 0.0082  
Transportation 0.0443 0.0001  0.0371 0.0001  0.0589 0.0001  
Banking and Insurance 0.0868 0.0001  0.0974 0.0001  0.0816 0.0001  
Other 0.0494 0.0001  0.0518 0.0001  0.0659 0.0008  
Primary School to 7th grade -0.0365 0.0001  -0.0350 0.0002  -0.0385 0.0011  
Technical high school -0.0213 0.0043  -0.0163 0.0877 * -0.0347 0.0033  
High school -0.0138 0.0636 * -0.0120 0.2065 * -0.0189 0.1093 *
Yeshiva -0.1127 0.0001  -0.1059 0.0001  0.0412 0.3763 *
Post-High school 0.0079 0.3058 * 0.0064 0.5197 * 0.0030 0.8058 *
Academic Institution 0.0292 0.0002  0.0270 0.0087  0.0242 0.0535 *
Other school -0.0016 0.8515 * -0.0054 0.6399 * -0.0043 0.7492 *
Years of schooling 0.0094 0.0001  0.0094 0.0001  0.0094 0.0001  
Married 0.0357 0.0001  0.0441 0.0001  0.0272 0.0004  
Divorced 0.0023 0.7272 * 0.0148 0.1686 * -0.0069 0.3955 *
Widow(er) 0.0058 0.4614 * 0.0301 0.0412  -0.0018 0.8479 *
Single 0.0053 0.3929 * 0.0178 0.0722 * -0.0043 0.5838 *
Academic occupation 0.0711 0.0001  0.0681 0.0001  0.0835 0.0001  
Free profession 0.0374 0.0001  0.0282 0.0001  0.0492 0.0001  
Manager 0.0708 0.0001  0.0693 0.0001  0.0842 0.0001  
clerk -0.0300 0.0001  -0.0314 0.0001  -0.0238 0.0016  
Skilled in services -0.0598 0.0001  -0.0410 0.0001  -0.0669 0.0001  
Skilled in agriculture -0.0792 0.0001  -0.0841 0.0001  -0.0519 0.0141  
Skilled in manufacturing -0.0543 0.0001  -0.0472 0.0001  -0.0891 0.0001  
Unskilled -0.0840 0.0001  -0.0832 0.0001  -0.0739 0.0001  
Work experience 0.0094 0.0001  0.0101 0.0001  0.0095 0.0001  
Work experience (squared ) -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0001 0.0001  
Unemployment rate -2.7503 0.0001  -2.8727 0.0001  -2.7061 0.0001  
New immigrant in the 90s -0.0252 0.0001  -0.0219 0.0001  -0.0208 0.0001  
Migrant intensity : "economically weak " persons
Manufacturing -0.1887 0.0057  -0.2318 0.0049  -0.3232 0.0099  
Construction 0.0038 0.3142 * -0.0004 0.9261 * 0.0237 0.2090 *
Agriculture -0.0169 0.0012  -0.0158 0.0101  -0.0244 0.0145  
Trade -0.1021 0.4661 * -0.2832 0.1014 * -0.0713 0.7700 *
Food and tourism -0.0126 0.1288 * -0.0203 0.0592 * -0.0173 0.1830 *
Business services -0.1434 0.0001  -0.2709 0.0001  0.0035 0.9314 *
Migrant intensity : "economically strong " persons
Manufacturing 0.4517 0.0001  0.6093 0.0001  0.5190 0.0001  
Construction 0.0140 0.0001  0.0145 0.0002  0.0120 0.1284 *
Agriculture 0.0173 0.0022  0.0196 0.0035  0.0173 0.1003 *
Trade 0.1806 0.1017 * 0.2451 0.0946 * 0.1197 0.4786 *
Food and tourism 0.0007 0.9106 * -0.0276 0.0018  0.0291 0.0030  
Business services 0.1350 0.0001  0.1681 0.0001  0.1292 0.0001  
Number of Observations 64736 35258 29477
Adjusted R 2 0.443 0.448 0.430
*indicates insignificant coefficients at Pr>0.05
Regression 1: general Regression 2: men Regression 3: women
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Table 4: The Determinants of the the Individual's Rank in the Wage Structure
OLS
Explanatory Variable
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Parameter 
Estimate Prob>ITI
Intercept 0.5248 0.0001  0.483382 0.0001  0.4961 0.0001  0.4523 0.0001  
Year 0.0000 0.0336  6.319E-05 0.0917 * -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0017  
Gender: m=1, f=0     
Jewish=1, Non-Jewish=0     
Year 1995 -0.0094 0.0842 * -0.013377 0.1212 * -0.0091 0.0787 * -0.0178 0.2935 *
Year 1996 -0.0115 0.0296  -0.006297 0.4926 * -0.0161 0.0016  -0.0142 0.4365 *
Electricity 0.1082 0.0001  0.036225 0.1784 * 0.0863 0.0001  0.1026 0.4072 *
Public sector 0.0412 0.0001  0.075799 0.0001  0.0358 0.0001  0.0653 0.0002  
Education -0.0098 0.058 * 0.097383 0.0001  0.0067 0.1107 * 0.0343 0.0139  
Health -0.0029 0.591 * 0.04654 0.0001  0.0025 0.5447 * 0.0168 0.2204 *
Community 0.0020 0.7029 * 0.0086 0.4093 * 0.0234 0.0001  0.0193 0.3425 *
Households 0.0412 0.0001  0.027682 0.0311  0.0127 0.0149  0.0124 0.4823 *
Transportation 0.0408 0.0001  0.02503 0.0016  0.0607 0.0001  -0.0029 0.9130 *
Banking and Insurance 0.0945 0.0001  0.145331 0.0001  0.0828 0.0001  0.0205 0.4343 *
Other 0.0499 0.0001  0.087705 0.0217  0.0622 0.0018  0.1464 0.2375 *
Primary School to 7th grade -0.0419 0.0003  -0.011885 0.3894 * -0.0378 0.0026  0.0005 0.9905 *
Technical high school -0.0232 0.0478  -0.001483 0.9218 * -0.0386 0.0018  0.0309 0.4712 *
High school -0.0163 0.1644 * -0.001903 0.8970 * -0.0198 0.1089 * -0.0016 0.9701 *
Yeshiva -0.1061 0.0001  0.134603 0.0940 * 0.0474 0.3375 * -0.0033 0.9803 *
Post-High school 0.0011 0.9311 * 0.00404 0.8060 * 0.0009 0.9445 * 0.0128 0.7763 *
Academic Institution 0.0237 0.0579 * 0.017426 0.3169 * 0.0226 0.0836 * 0.0329 0.4838 *
Other school -0.0120 0.3763 * 0.014338 0.5803 * -0.0072 0.6038 * 0.0249 0.6562 *
Years of schooling 0.0092 0.0001  0.009392 0.0001  0.0093 0.0001  0.0131 0.0001  
Married 0.0443 0.0001  0.049897 0.1604 * 0.0305 0.0001  -0.0224 0.4158 *
Divorced 0.0118 0.2985 * 0.062908 0.1330 * -0.0026 0.7605 * -0.0746 0.0172  
Widow(er) 0.0274 0.0798 * 0.074741 0.1599 * 0.0022 0.8207 * -0.0593 0.0925 *
Single 0.0134 0.2044 * 0.030818 0.3884 * 0.0050 0.5411 * -0.0934 0.0008  
Academic occupation 0.0664 0.0001  0.079489 0.0001  0.0810 0.0001  0.1040 0.0100  
Free profession 0.0260 0.0001  0.034979 0.0132  0.0455 0.0001  0.0817 0.0346  
Manager 0.0652 0.0001  0.091849 0.0001  0.0813 0.0001  0.0826 0.0997 *
clerk -0.0330 0.0001  -0.014337 0.2806 * -0.0255 0.0010  -0.0219 0.5650 *
Skilled in services -0.0423 0.0001  -0.019128 0.1130 * -0.0705 0.0001  -0.0251 0.5057 *
Skilled in agriculture -0.0840 0.0001  -0.06804 0.0005  -0.0472 0.0462  -0.0159 0.7777 *
Skilled in manufacturing -0.0491 0.0001  -0.020341 0.0790 * -0.0875 0.0001  -0.0484 0.2087 *
Unskilled -0.0864 0.0001  -0.062246 0.0001  -0.0743 0.0001  -0.0615 0.1012 *
Work experience 0.0109 0.0001  0.006215 0.0001  0.0101 0.0001  0.0035 0.0010  
Work experience (squared) -0.0001 0.0001  -6.65E-05 0.0001  -0.0002 0.0001  0.0000 0.9305 *
Unemployment rate -2.8220 0.0001  -3.090418 0.0001  -2.7335 0.0001  -2.3260 0.0069  
New immigrant in the 90s -0.0206 0.0001  -0.002342 0.7718 * -0.0220 0.0001  -0.0135 0.2420 *
Migrant intensity: "economically weak" persons
Manufacturing -0.2655 0.0054  0.065105 0.6873 * -0.2936 0.0309  0.5470 0.1068 *
Construction -0.0032 0.5839 * 0.006624 0.2054 * 0.0045 0.8259 * 0.1388 0.0021  
Agriculture -0.0124 0.1415 * -0.017598 0.0374  -0.0265 0.0264  0.0015 0.9377 *
Trade -0.2462 0.2431 * -0.047722 0.8657 * -0.3580 0.1645 * 2.3574 0.0014  
Food and tourism -0.0255 0.0597 * -0.004288 0.7898 * -0.0152 0.2686 * -0.0180 0.6469 *
Business services -0.2906 0.0001  -0.04296 0.5814 * -0.0037 0.9310 * 0.0813 0.5355 *
Migrant intensity: "economically strong" persons
Manufacturing 0.6163 0.0001  0.362113 0.0552 * 0.5641 0.0001  -0.5121 0.2327 *
Construction 0.0169 0.0003  0.007824 0.2365 * 0.0147 0.0742 * -0.0172 0.5286 *
Agriculture 0.0192 0.0142  0.024588 0.0371  0.0173 0.1266 * 0.0054 0.8550 *
Trade 0.2537 0.1334 * 0.218215 0.4408 * 0.2449 0.1642 * -1.0415 0.0809 *
Food and tourism -0.0267 0.0082  -0.003672 0.8366 * 0.0292 0.0039  0.0254 0.5645 *
Business services 0.1811 0.0001  0.045627 0.4895 * 0.1443 0.0001  -0.1789 0.1000 *
Number of Observations 28870 6387 27514 1962
Adjusted R2 0.422 0.400 0.417 0.491
Dependent variable : The rank of the Israeli individual's gross wage
on the (yearly) Lorenz curve of wage earners - 1995 to 2000
Regression 4: Jewish 
men Regression 5: Arab men
Regression 6: Jewish 
women
Regression 7: Arab 
women
20
5.2 The Effect of Migrant Workers on Real Wages
In order to investigate which effect dominates - substitution or complementarity - we
regress real wages on various population groups by economic branches (tables 5 and
6) and by occupations (table 7). The regressions, on which tables 5 and 6 are based,
include - besides migrant intensity - the usual variables (gender, religion, experience,
number of school-years, other family members’ income, marital status and
occupation), which are not shown here26. Each cell in table 5 reports on the direction
of the effect of the migrant intensity variable in the regression based on the population
group indicated in the first column of the corresponding row in the table.
Migrant intensity differs considerably between the various branches. Nevertheless,
judging from the regressions in table 5, we find that in most of the branches the
relationship is complementary in the sense that an increase in migrant intensity raises
real wages. In construction – a highly migrant intensive branch, the effect is
insignificant, while in some of the regressions of agriculture the complementarity
parameter is statistically significant. In business services, food and tourism and in
community services (which include personal care for the aged and invalids), sectors
that have experienced increasing migrant intensity, complementarity is also the
dominant effect. The only sector in which substitution dominates, is industry, where
migrant intensity has been low.
Table 6 differs from table 5 only by the addition of a one-year lag for migrant
intensity. The result is a further weakening of statistical significance and a reversal of
the negative coefficient (which becomes insignificant) in industry. Judging on the
basis of tables 5 and 6 then, would hint at a relatively beneficial influence from
migration on real wages, which to some extent contradicts the results from tables 3
and 4. However, the nature of the effect becomes clearer in table 7.27 We find that the
lower are the professional requirements of the occupation, the more the effects
become negative (and statistically significant). The economically weakest persons
(unskilled workers) are among the losers in practically all branches, whereas for
managers and academics, the effect is more ambiguous.
                                                  
26 Available upon request from the author
27 Each row represents a regression, which includes - besides migrant intensity – variables, such as
gender, religion, experience, number of school-years, other family members’ income, marital status and
economic branches, which are not shown here.
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Table 5: The Direction of the Partial Effect of Migrant Workers on Israeli Real Wages 1)
by Economic Branch
Construction Agriculture
Business 
services
Food and 
Tourism
Community 
services Industry
1 General **- + + + + -
2 General, age 45+ **- + + + + -
3 General, age 25-44 **+ **+ + **+ + -
4 Men **- + + + + -
5 Men, age 45+ *- + + + + -
6 Men, age 25-44 **+ **+ + **+ + -
7 Women **+ + + + + -
8 Women, age 45+ **- #N/A + *+ + -
9 Women, age 25-44 **- #N/A + #N/A + -
10 Jewish Men **- *+ + + + -
11 Jewish Men, age 45+ - + + + + -
12 Jewish Men, age 25-44 **+ **+ + **+ + -
13 Arab Men *+ + *+ **+ **+ *-
14 Arab Men, age 45+ **+ **+ **+ **- **+ **-
15 Arab Men, age 25-44 **+ **- *+ **+ **+ -
16 Jewish Women **+ #N/A + + + *-
17 Jewish Women, age 45+ #N/A #N/A + + + **-
18 Jewish Women, age 25-44 **- #N/A + **+ + -
19 Arab Women #N/A #N/A + #N/A #N/A -
20 Arab Women, age 45+ #N/A #N/A *- #N/A #N/A **-
21 Arab Women, age 25-44 #N/A #N/A + **+ #N/A **-
1) The sign indicates the direction of the effect. No superfix - implies a 95% or higer statistical significance;
* indicates statistical significance at 90-95 percent;
** indicates that the parameter is not statistically significant.
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In a forthcoming study, using the present data base Cohen (2002) extends the results
of table 6, by using a variable of “economically weak” and “economically strong”
workers, as developed in tables 3 and 4. He finds, that the “economically weak”
workers’ wages experienced a significant reduction, while the opposite was true for
the wages of “economically strong” workers.
Table 6: The Direction of the Partial Effect of Migrant Workers on Israeli Real Wages 1)
by economic branch, including one lag
Agriculture
Business 
services
Food and 
Tourism Construction Industry
t-1,t t-1,t t-1,t t-1,t t-1,t
1 General -,+ +,+ +,+ **-, - +,**-
2 General, age 45+ *-, + #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
3 General, age 25-44 -, **+ #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
4 Men -, + +,**+ +,+ **-, - +,**-
5 Men, age 45+ **-, + #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
6 Men, age 25-44 **-, **+ #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
7 Women -, + +,**+ **-,+ **-,**- +,**-
8 Women, age 45+ #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
9 Women, age 25-44 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
10 Jewish Men **-,+ +,**+ **+, **+ **-,- +,**-
11 Jewish Men, age 45+ ,+ #N/A #N/A **-,- #N/A
12 Jewish Men, age 25-44 **-, **+ #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
13 Arab Men **-,**+ **+, **+ +, **+ **-,**- +,**-
14 Arab Men, age 45+ #N/A #N/A #N/A **-,**- #N/A
15 Arab Men, age 25-44 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
16 Jewish Women #N/A +,**+ **-, + **-,**- +,**-
17 Jewish Women, age 45+ #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
18 Jewish Women, age 25-44 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
19 Arab Women #N/A +,**+ #N/A #N/A +,**-
20 Arab Women, age 45+ #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
21 Arab Women, age 25-44 #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A #N/A
1) The sign indicates the direction of the effect . No superfix - implies a 95% or higer statistical significance;
* indicates statistical significance at 90-95 percent;
** indicates that the parameter is not statistically significant .
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5.3 The Effect on the Probability of Non-participation in the Labor Force
A more permanent and socially consequential influence on the individuals’ economic
well being than the changes in real wages stems from the effect of migrant intensity
on labor force participation. The regressions are presented in tables 8 and 9.
Following are the main conclusions:
Gender and Nationality: Men are less likely than women to be outside the labor
force. So are Jewish workers compared to non-Jewish workers (this result is
statistically more significant among women).28
The replacement ratio: This ratio operates as a relative price variable. The higher the
ratio, the higher the incentive to exit the labor force. Evidence shows that even a slight
increase in the replacement ratio (either due to an increase in the income support or a
fall in the alternative wage) has a considerable negative impact on the probability of
participation in the labor force. This variable has been found to be statistically
significant with respect to all population groups. As shown in tables 8 and 9, the odds
ratio of the replacement ratio is significantly smaller than 1 for all the population
groups. Furthermore the ratio is also sensitive in the domain between zero and 1: the
odds ratio in all regressions is below 0.1 for a zero replacement rate and about 3 to 9
Table 7: The Direction of the Partial Effect of Migrant Workers on Israeli Real Wages 1)
Construction Industry
Food and 
Tourism Agriculture
Business 
services
- + **- *- **-
**+ **+ **- - +
**- **+ - **- +
*- **- - **- **-
**- - - - -
**- - - - -
1) The sign indicates the direction of the effect.
No superfix - implies a 95% or higer statistical significance;
* indicates statistical significance at 90-95 percent;
** indicates that the parameter is not statistically significant .
Unskilled workers
by Occupation
Managers
Free profession
Clerks
Skilled workers
Occupation
Academic occupation
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times higher (but still below 1) for a replacement rate between zero and 1, the
reference replacement rate being above 1. Since the replacement rate can effectively
be manipulated by the government, this implies that the government could reverse the
negative incentive through conscious management either by reducing the individual’s
incentive to apply for income support and by strengthening “make-work-pay”
policies, or else, by raising the alternative wage (e.g. through efficient minimum wage
enforcement for migrants, implementation of penalties on the hiring of illegal
migrants). Chart 5 suggests, that the replacement ratio played probably a significant
role in explaining the sharp and prolonged increase in the share of income support
recipients out of the working age population.29 It also emphasizes the need for a
policy, which can reverse the current disincentive, as reflected in the worsening of the
replacement ratio. We conclude that the government should adopt a sensible and well
enforced permit policy by (a) reducing the number of permits for migrants and by
implementing a more balanced skill requirement instead of the present bias in favor of
unskilled migrants.
                                                                                                                                                 
28 A similar result is obtained by Brender et al. (2001).
29 This chart shows the actual number of households whose head is in working age (15-64, 59 for
women) enjoying income support divided by the working age population. The chart is reproduced from
Gottlieb (2002). See also Shaviv (1999).
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The result concerning the work-discouraging effect of the number of children is
consistent with other empirical studies30. The relatively low McFadden R2 stresses the
need for further research in this area.
                                                  
30 The data do not allow for a distinction between the effect of the number of children and child
allowances. The latters’ idiosyncratic structure, as implemented in Israel, probably bias the results
toward high birth rates.
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Table 8: The Determinants of the Probability of being outside the Labor Force
Dependent variable : outside the labor force=1, inside the labor force=0
Logistic regression All Men Women
Reference group variable
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
constant 0.6392 .  -1.3083 .  1.0972 .  
gender (male =1) -1.5442 0.213  
Religion (Jewish=1) -0.8729 0.418  -0.0263 0.974 * -1.532 0.216  
New immigrant -0.1959 0.822  -0.1738 0.84  -0.302 0.739  
Primary School -7th grade 0.0227 1.023 * -0.3293 0.719  0.2847 1.329  
Technical high school 0.0224 1.023 * -0.2563 0.774  0.1452 1.156  
High school 0.0988 1.104 * -0.0636 0.938 * 0.148 1.16  
Yeshiva 3.3119 27.436  3.1033 22.271  0.3308 1.392 *
Post-High school -0.042 0.959 * -0.0486 0.953 * -0.0394 0.961 *
Other school 0.171 1.187  0.2541 1.289 * 0.115 1.122 *
Divorced -0.6704 0.512  0.1103 1.117 * -0.7544 0.47  
Widow(er) -0.1291 0.879 * 0.583 1.791  -0.2005 0.818  
Single -1.0938 0.335  -0.3543 0.702  -1.533 0.216  
0 - 4 years 1.1496 3.157  1.1693 3.22  1.1809 3.257  
5 - 14 years 0.5235 1.688  -0.0847 0.919 * 0.6672 1.949  
15 - 24 years 0.3183 1.375  0.222 1.249  0.3735 1.453  
0 -2.7609 0.063  -3.5202 0.03  -2.638 0.072  
0 - 1% -1.5749 0.207  -1.3002 0.272  -1.7682 0.171  
11 - 14% 0.2221 1.249  0.4083 1.504  0.1543 1.167  
14 % or more 0.4172 1.518  0.8065 2.24  0.2806 1.324  
up to 8 years 1.9529 7.049  1.5747 4.829  2.1409 8.507  
9 - 10 years 1.2588 3.521  0.8705 2.388  1.461 4.31  
11 - 12 years 0.8469 2.332  0.4484 1.566  1.0175 2.766  
13 - 15 years 0.4536 1.574  0.2743 1.316  0.5708 1.77  
year 1999 -0.0192 0.981 * -0.0488 0.952 * -0.0098 0.99 *
year 1997 0.0845 1.088  0.0635 1.066 * 0.1284 1.137  
4 - 7 children 0.6692 1.953  0.3505 1.42  1.0364 2.819  
more than 8 children 1.2964 3.656  0.7571 2.132  2.1279 8.398  
Number of observations 83415 40545 42870
Response Profile
1 20235 5701 14534
0 63180 34844 28336
McFadden R^2 0.238 0.263 0.229
*indicates insignificant coefficients at Pr>0.05
migrant intensity 
0% - 10 %
Years of 
schooling: 16 
years or more
Number of 
children : up to 3
Academic Institution
Experience: 25 
years or more
Replacement 
ratio : 1 % or more
Married
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Similar logit regressions on the probability of being employed versus unemployed
were much less successful. The main explanatory variables that were significant are
the occupation (odds ratio smaller than 1 and decreasing with inferiorly remunerated
occupations compared to managerial occupation), work experience (odds ratio greater
than 1 from 5 years and more) and spouse income (surprisingly the odds ratio was
greater than 1).31 The overall results for migrant intensity were inconclusive. The
replacement ratio could not be used, since the data on unemployment do not include
information on its duration and therefore the relevant replacement ratio cannot be
properly calculated.
                                                  
31 Regression results are available upon request from the author.
Table 9: The Determinants of the Probability of being outside the Labor Force
Dependent variable : outside the labor force =1, inside the labor force =0
Logistic regression Jewish Men Non-Jewish Men Jewish Women Non-Jewish Women
Reference group variable
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
Parameter 
Estimate
Odds 
Ratio
constant -1.310 .  -2.101 .  -0.447 .  1.549 .  
New immigrant -0.140 0.870 * -0.365 0.694 * -0.029 0.972 * -2.525 0.080  
Primary School -7th grade -0.231 0.794  -1.100 0.333  0.223 1.250  -0.213 0.809 *
Technical high school -0.029 0.972 * -1.843 0.158  0.355 1.426  -1.279 0.278  
High school 0.135 1.144 * -1.106 0.331  0.258 1.294  -0.218 0.804 *
Yeshiva 3.056 21.251  2.546 12.750 * 0.511 1.667 * -1.328 0.265 *
Post-High school 0.009 1.009 * -0.442 0.643 * 0.095 1.100  -0.873 0.418  
Other school 0.311 1.365  -0.026 0.974 * 0.166 1.181 * -0.093 0.911 *
Divorced 0.151 1.163 * 0.312 1.367 * -0.707 0.493  -1.796 0.166  
Widow(er) 0.508 1.663  1.597 4.936  -0.127 0.881 * -1.093 0.335  
Single -0.301 0.740  -0.258 0.773 * -1.197 0.302  -3.832 0.022  
0 - 4 years 1.210 3.352  0.638 1.892  1.073 2.925  1.657 5.243  
5 - 14 years -0.088 0.916 * -0.146 0.864 * 0.596 1.815  0.937 2.552  
15 - 24 years 0.203 1.225  0.200 1.221 * 0.387 1.473  0.070 1.072 *
0 -3.438 0.032  -3.714 0.024  -2.671 0.069  -3.089 0.046  
0 - 1% -1.432 0.239  -0.293 0.746 * -1.777 0.169  -2.409 0.090  
11 - 14% 0.484 1.623  0.218 1.243 * 0.238 1.269  -0.422 0.656  
14 % or more 0.859 2.362  0.705 2.024  0.341 1.406  -0.037 0.963 *
up to 8 years 1.477 4.378  2.385 10.859  1.938 6.943  3.901 49.435  
9 - 10 years 0.653 1.921  1.967 7.151  1.166 3.209  3.359 28.748  
11 - 12 years 0.253 1.288  1.730 5.642  0.824 2.280  2.090 8.088  
13 - 15 years 0.241 1.273  0.762 2.143  0.528 1.696  0.883 2.418  
year 1999 -0.074 0.929 * 0.073 1.076 * -0.031 0.970 * 0.188 1.207 *
year 1997 0.039 1.040 * 0.210 1.233 * 0.107 1.113  0.555 1.743  
4 - 7 children 0.415 1.514  0.231 1.260  1.026 2.791  0.790 2.203  
more than 8 children 0.763 2.145  0.710 2.033  2.033 7.638  3.301 27.135  
Number of observations 34151 6394 36731 6139
Response Profile
1 4787 914 9918 4616
0 29364 5480 26813 1523
McFadden R^ 2 0.263 0.298 0.130 0.400
*indicates insignificant coefficients at Pr> 0.05
migrant intensity 
0% - 10 %
Years of 
schooling : 16 
years or more
Number of 
children : up to 3
Academic 
Institution
Married
Experience : 25 
years or more
Replacement 
ratio : 1 % or 
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One possible explanation for the relatively better success of the participation equation
compared to the employment/unemployment equation is that the process of worker
migration is a stock variable as is the exit from the labor force, whereas a person’s
unemployment status resembles more a flow variable, since an unemployed person
will either return to employment, or, if chronically unemployed, will tend to drop out
of the labor force, after becoming discouraged from seeking employment. This might
be one explanation for the better performance of migrant intensity in the participation
equation, compared to the unemployment equation. Indeed, the sample size grows
heavily toward the latter years.
5.4 The Effect on Inequality in Market Earnings from Work
Perhaps the most striking and consequential effect on the well being of the Israeli
population is the impact of the Israeli government’s migrant worker policy on market
earnings from work. This effect can be measured on various income definitions. Since
the main focus in this study is to analyze the consequences on the earning capacity
and on the Israeli population’s ability to be integrated in the labor force, the preferred
concept is gross earnings from work, including self-employment.32
The empirical results up to now provide a clear indication: We expect economically
weak Israelis, such as the poorly educated and low skilled, who lost their jobs and
eventually left the labor force, to be the main losers from the government’s current
migrant worker strategy. This result is reflected in table 10.
While regression 1 in table 3 relates exclusively to Israeli wage earners, the regression
in table 10 relates to the working age population as a whole, thus including in addition
to wage earners also the self-employed, the unemployed and the people outside the
labor force.33 The regression on the individual rank on the corresponding Lorenz
curve points to a significant increase in gross earnings inequality due to migrant
intensity.34 Interestingly, the coefficients of both the weak and the strong members of
                                                  
32 This is the reason for the focus on earned income from work rather than net post-tax and post transfer
income or the inclusion of capital income.
33 The income survey reports positive gross earnings from work only for the employed and the self-
employed. The missing value in the vectors of the non-employed can thus logically be imputed to be
zero, as was done in this study.
34 See Flug and Kassir, 2001 for an extensive analysis of poverty in Israel.
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the working age population are negative, indicating a worsening of their ranks, but the
absolute value of the coefficient of the “economically weak” turns out to be about
twice as high as that of the “economically strong”. The conclusion is that the personal
income distribution worsened considerably over time. In other words the Lorenz
curve became increasingly bent, implying a rising Gini-coefficient. In other words,
the growing migrant intensity played an important role in explaining increasing
earnings inequality. Similarly to table 3, academic education, the number of school-
years, marriage, a remunerating occupation, a long work experience, male gender and
being Jewish all improve the individual’s rank in the income distribution.
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                  Table 10: Determinants of the Rank *
            in the Distribution of Earnings from Work
Dependent variable : Rank of Earnings from Work
OLS Coefficients Prob > ITI Pr>.05
Explanatory Variables
Constant 0.1798 0.0001  
Gender: m=1, f=0 0.0878 0.0001  
Religion : Jewish=1, non-Jewish=0 0.0113 0.0001  
1995 dummy -0.0126 0.2079 *
1996 dummy -0.0049 0.6523 *
1997 dummy 0.0005 0.9374 *
Primary School to 7th grade -0.0318 0.0001  
Technical high school -0.0114 0.0007  
High school -0.0050 0.1255 *
Yeshiva -0.0957 0.0001  
Post-High school 0.0004 0.9037 *
Academic Institution 0.0244 0.0001  
Number of School Years 0.0058 0.0001  
Married 0.0226 0.0001  
Divorced 0.0037 0.4722 *
Widow(er) 0.0220 0.0001  
Academic occupation 0.1115 0.0001  
Free profession 0.0218 0.0001  
Manager 0.2030 0.0001  
clerk 0.0165 0.0001  
Skilled in services -0.0829 0.0001  
Skilled in agriculture -0.1156 0.0001  
unskilled -0.0738 0.0001  
Work experience 0.0064 0.0001  
Work experience (squared) 0.0001 0.0001  
Unemployment rate -0.5026 0.3335 *
New immigrant in the 90s -0.0247 0.0001  
Migrant Intensity
Economically Weak Worker -0.3555 0.0001  
Economically Strong Worker -0.1668 0.0001  
Labor Market Status
Unemployed -0.2745 0.0001  
Outside the Labor Force -0.1567 0.0001  
Number of Observations : 113,718
Adjusted R2 0.5543
*indicates insignificant coefficients at Pr> 0.05
# The rank is calculated relative to earnings in the same year.
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6. Conclusions
The opening up the Israeli labor market to migrant workers in the early 1990s
reflected a conscious government decision to hire foreign workers in specific low-
skill-intensive branches, in order to substitute for the Palestinian workers, barred from
access, due to a security-oriented political decision. The exposure was at first strictly
limited to the agriculture and construction sectors. Later on, permits were also
extended to certain services sectors, mainly the care for the aged and the chronically
sick and invalid population. At some stage the computer industry’s demand for
permits for computer specialists was denied, largely due to the strong enough pressure
group, which opposed the idea for fear of competition and the unavoidable fall in
wages in the hi-tech sector. Besides the policy driven exposure to migrant workers,
the recent surge in the number of illegal foreign workers reflects a general tendency of
an inflow of workers from countries with low per capita income and an excess supply
of labor to countries with significantly higher per capita income, which is one facet of
globalization, reflected also in the Israeli economy. The combination of inadequate
enforcement of labor laws, economic interests involved in hiring migrant workers at
lower cost than that of hiring Israeli competing workers and of the latters’ (rational)
short term preference to exit the labor force and their absorption into the more
lucrative national income support scheme, prevented until now an efficient struggle
with the detrimental economic and social consequences that ensued.
The empirical results suggest that earnings inequality was negatively affected from
the interaction of the government’s migrant-workers policy and the existing income
support scheme for persons in working age. This situation, which resulted in the
exclusion of economically weak workers from the labor force, is therefore to a
significant extent the direct responsibility of a faulty government policy. The
government’s decision – through its permit policy and an inadequate implementation
of labor laws – on exposing exclusively the low skilled occupations to migration,
focused the deterioration of earnings inequality on the economically weak part of the
Israeli society. It was found that the worsening in the earnings inequality was caused
more by the exclusion of Israelis from the labor force than by a fall in wages. The
analysis of the effect on relative wages suggests that there were parallel forces at
work: substitution, which caused a downward pressure on wages of economically
weak workers and a complementary effect, causing upward pressure on wages of
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workers, which are economically better off. The effects on relative wages were not
limited only to the economic sectors, which had been exposed to a sizeable inflow of
migrant workers. Within a relatively short time they spread to other sectors as well.
It turns out, that the relevant policy tools, as reflected in the replacement ratio, i.e. the
ratio of income support divided by the alternative wage, are indeed powerful. This
study therefore emphasizes the potential for a reversal if the government’s labor
market strategy were to change. The major policy tools for such a reversal are (1) an
efficient reduction of the number of permits, (2) avoidance of the bias in permit policy
toward low skilled workers, (3) efficient implementation of labor laws and (4) a
change in the government’s income support policy together with an active labor
market policy, aimed at creating an incentive for labor force participation. Such
measures have been successfully implemented in economies that underwent reforms
in their welfare policy and in the areas of job training and job search.  In Israel this
reform still remains to be implemented.
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